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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate the level of compliance with, and disclosure of,
good corporate governance (CG) practices among UK publicly listed firms and consequently ascertain
whether board characteristics and ownership structure variables can explain observable differences in
the extent of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices.
Design/methodology/approach – This study uses one of the largest data sets to-date on compliance
and disclosure of CG practices from 2008 to 2013 containing 120 CG provisions drawn from the 2010
UK Combined Code relating to 100 UK listed firms to conduct multiple regression analyses of the
determinants of voluntary CG disclosures. A number of additional estimations, including two stage least
squares, fixed-effects and lagged structures, are conducted to address the potential endogeneity issue
and test the robustness of the findings.
Findings – The results suggest that there is a substantial variation in the levels of compliance with,
and disclosure of, good CG practices among the sampled UK firms. The authors also find that firms
with larger board size, more independent outside directors and greater director diversity tend to
disclose more CG information voluntarily, whereas the level of voluntary CG compliance and
disclosure is insignificantly related to the existence of a separate CG committee and institutional
ownership. Additionally, the results indicate that block ownership and managerial ownership
negatively affect voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. The findings are fairly robust
across a number of econometric models that sufficiently address various endogeneity problems
and alternative CG indices. Overall, the findings are generally consistent with the predictions of
neo-institutional theory.
Originality/value – This study extends, as well as contributes to, the extant CG literature by offering
new evidence on compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG recommendations contained in the 2010
UK Combined Code following the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. This study also advances the
existing literature by offering new insights from a neo-institutional theoretical perspective of the impact
of board and ownership mechanisms on voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices.
Keywords Corporate governance, Board and ownership mechanisms, Comply or explain,
Neo-institutional theory, UK Combined Code
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
This study seeks to extend, as well as contribute to, the extant literature by:
 investigating why and how UK listed firms may voluntarily comply with and disclose
information relating to CG recommendations contained in the influential 2010 UK
Combined Code; and
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 consequently examining whether ownership and board characteristics can explain
observable differences in CG compliance and disclosure practices with specific
focus on providing new empirical insights following the 2007/2008 global financial
crisis.
Our analysis is informed by a neo-institutional theoretical perspective.
The past decade has witnessed an increased interest in the extent of voluntary CG
compliance and disclosure practices (Conyon and Mallin, 1997; Elghuweel et al., 2016;
Elshandidy and Neri, 2015; Melis et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2012b; Ntim, 2016; Pass, 2006;
Waweru, 2014). Whilst varied justifications have been provided to explain why firms may
voluntarily disclose information relating to their CG practices (Hussainey and Al-Najjar,
2012; Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim, 2015; Al-Bassam et al., 2016; Ntim et al., 2016),
recent theoretical advancements indicate that institutional context and theory can explain
the considerable growth in the issuance and/or adoption of codes of CG practices around
the world (Adegbite, 2015; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Al-Bassam and Ntim, 2016).
Particularly, and from neo-institutional theoretical perspective, institutional forces (e.g.
political, social and economic institutions) can influence the spread and/or the imposition
of business norms/practices on firms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991; Scott, 2001).
These institutional forces have generally been suggested to be driven by two main reasons:
efficiency (“substantive management”) and legitimation (“symbolic management”)
(Adegbite, 2015; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Observably, neo-institutional
theoretical perspective has been used by prior studies in explaining the institutional forces,
which can facilitate or constrain the diffusion of corporate practices at the national-level of
analysis, including the adoption of international financial reporting standards (Maroun and
Van-Zijl, 2015), CG standards (Adegbite, 2015; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008) and CSR
practices (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). By contrast, neo-institutional theoretical
perspective has rarely been used towards explaining the rapid adoption of good CG
standards at the firm-level of analysis. Arguably, this limits current understanding of
institutional forces that may be able to explain the rapid proliferation of good CG standards
at the firm level.
Accordingly, this study aims to extend, as well as contribute to, the current literature by
applying neo-institutional theoretical perspective to explain differences in CG practices
and with specific focus on the efficiency and legitimation implications of neo-institutional
theory. The neo-institutional (efficiency view) perspective proposes that institutional
pressures (i.e. coercive, mimetic and normative pressures) can force economic entities to
compete strongly to gain access to critical resources which can maximise the wealth of
shareholders (Adegbite, 2015; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). Hence, committing to high levels
of accountability/transparency in the form of engaging in increased voluntary[1] CG
disclosure can allow firms to gain access to crucial resources by improving their reputation
and goodwill (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Additionally, greater engagement in voluntary
CG disclosures can improve the performance of economic entities by reducing the conflict
of interest between management and owners through improvement in the flow of
information between them (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Similarly, the legitimation view of neo-institutional theory proposes that coercive pressures
can force corporations to behave according to socially accepted standards/conventions.
This is because conforming to such socially expected and accepted standards/
conventions can improve legitimacy of a company’s operations and also enhance its social
acceptance (Duff, 2014; Suchman, 1995). Therefore, committing to good CG practices can
be one way by which corporate goals may be aligned with those of the larger society and
that can in turn help legitimise corporate operations via improved corporate image and
reputation. Furthermore, the need to keep good relationships with powerful corporate
stakeholders (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and thus improving corporate reputation and
image, can compel economic entities to conform to or voluntarily mimic socially expected
and accepted standards/conventions (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999). For instance, greater
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commitment to good governance standards in the form of engaging in greater CG
disclosures may improve the legitimacy of firms by gaining the support of influential
stakeholders, including shareholders and governments, who are central to the ability of
corporations to maintain sustainable operations (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008).
Due to various reasons underlying corporate disclosure behaviour, previous research has
investigated the extent, motives and antecedents of voluntary disclosure practices (Cooke,
1992; Botosan, 1997; Barako et al., 2006). However, the existing voluntary disclosure
literature has a number of observable weaknesses. First, despite the importance of good
CG practices and the considerable amount of CG reforms that have been pursued
worldwide (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004), existing voluntary disclosure literature is
primarily focused on investigating general financial disclosures (Allegrini and Greco, 2013;
Cheng and Courtenay, 2006), social and environmental disclosures (Cuadrado-Ballesteros
et al., 2015; Grougiou et al., 2016; Reverte, 2009) and risk disclosures (Cabedo and Tirado,
2004; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015; Ntim et al., 2013). In contrast, studies examining why and
how public corporations may voluntarily comply with and disclose information about their
CG practices are scarce (Adegbite, 2015; Pass, 2006; Bozec and Bozec, 2007).
Second, the few studies that have examined voluntary disclosure of CG practices are
impaired in that they measure compliance indirectly through a survey (Adegbite, 2015;
Conyon, 1994; Conyon and Mallin, 1997)/subjective analysts ratings (Patel et al., 2002;
Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012) or investigate a small number of CG provisions (Arcot et al.,
2010; Padgett and Shabbir, 2005), thereby arguably limiting the generalisability of their
findings. Third, despite increasing theoretical and empirical suggestions that relying on a
neo-institutional theoretical perspective can help in explaining the varied reasons often
underlying corporate voluntary disclosures (Ntim et al., 2013), existing studies are either
mainly descriptive (Patel et al., 2002; Waweru, 2014) or have used this theory to examine
institutional forces that influence the adoption of CG standards mainly at a national level of
analysis (Adegbite, 2015; Judge et al., 2010; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). In contrast, studies
that used neo-institutional theoretical perspectives to examine issues relating to the
adoption of good CG standards at the firm level are rare. Arguably, this impedes our ability
to fully understand and explain the different managerial motives for voluntary CG
disclosures.
Fourth, notwithstanding increasing suggestions that poor CG practices partly contributed
to the 2007/2008 global financial crisis (FRC, 2010, 2012), there seems to be generally
inadequate empirical evidence and serious academic reflections on its effects on CG and
disclosure practices (Ferri and Maber, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013). Finally, despite the
theoretical and empirical indications that corporate decisions, such as disclosure is mainly
a function of top management and ownership structure (Ntim et al., 2012a), existing
literature have largely examined how general firm attributes (e.g. size, leverage and
liquidity) can influence voluntary disclosure of CG practices (Cooke, 1992; Patel et al.,
2002; Waweru, 2014). This also limits current understanding of the extent to which
corporate board and ownership characteristics can affect voluntary disclosure of CG
practices.
Given the apparent weaknesses of the extant literature, we seek to examine voluntary CG
disclosure behaviour among listed UK corporations. The UK offers a particularly interesting
context to conduct the current study for the following reasons. First, since 1992, the UK has
been in the leading position of pursuing global CG reforms (e.g. Cadbury Report, 1992;
Greenbury Report, 1995; Hampel Report, 1998; Turnbull Report, 1999; Higgs Report, 2003;
Smith Report, 2003; FRC, 20102012). For example, the influential 1992 Cadbury Report,
which promoted the concept of voluntary CG compliance regime (“comply or explain”), has
been adopted by almost every country in the world. As will be discussed further and since
1992, over 30 good CG guides have been produced and consolidated into the “Combined
Code”. Thus, a study of this nature will have important implications not only for the UK but
also for CG reforms that have been pursued around the world. Second, apart from pursuing
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influential CG reforms, public corporations have relatively dispersed ownership structure,
suggesting that voluntary compliance regime (“comply or explain”) may be appropriate
(MacNeil and Li, 2006). Third, the UK has a fairly strong track record of applying and
imposing corporate regulations with stronger level of shareholder activism. The market for
corporate, capital, service, product and managerial control is also fairly strong. Arguably,
these contextual characteristics render the UK a germane environment to examine
voluntary CG disclosure behaviour.
In fact, it is somewhat an empirical anomaly that only a small number of previous studies
have sought to investigate voluntary CG disclosures among UK listed corporations despite
the powerful nature of its governance reforms with observable limitations (Conyon, 1994;
Conyon and Mallin, 1997; Pass, 2006; Arcot et al., 2010; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012;
Mallin and Ow-Young, 2012; Shrives and Brennan, 2015). For example, Conyon (1994) and
Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012) examine voluntary CG disclosures among UK firms by
using a survey and subjective analysts rankings, respectively. Similarly, Pass (2006) and
Arcot et al. (2010) examine only a small number of CG provisions. Mallin and Ow-Yong
(2012) only analyse small- and medium-sized firms listed on the alternative investment
market (AIM), whilst Shrives and Brennan (2015) focused only on analysing the quality of
CG explanations for non-compliance with the recommendations of 2003 and 2010 codes
among largest UK listed firms. Hence, this study aims to broaden the current
understanding of, as well as contribute to, existing studies in several ways. First, we
contribute to the extant literature by offering new evidence on compliance with, and
disclosure of, good CG recommendations included in the 2010 UK Combined Code by
constructing the most comprehensive CG compliance and disclosure index to-date,
consisting of 120 CG provisions. Second, we advance the existing literature by providing
evidence on the extent to which corporate board characteristics and ownership structure
variables can explain observable changes in voluntary CG disclosures. Third, we
contribute to existing literature by offering new insights from a neo-institutional theoretical
perspective to interpret voluntary CG disclosure behaviours. Finally, we offer a timely new
empirical insights relating to CG structures and disclosure practices following the 2007/
2008 global financial crisis.
Our evidence twofold; first, our findings indicate that the level of compliance with, and
disclosure of, good CG recommendations included in the 2010 Combined Code is
generally high but varies substantially among the sampled corporations. Second, we find
that board size, the proportion of independent outside directors and board diversity are
significantly and positively related to voluntary CG disclosures, whereas the presence of a
separate CG committee and institutional ownership have a positive but insignificant
association with voluntary CG disclosures. Additionally, managerial and block ownership
negatively affect the levels of voluntary CG disclosures. Our findings are fairly robust
across a number of econometric models that sufficiently address various endogeneity
concerns and alternative CG indices. Overall, our findings are largely in line with the
expectations of neo-institutional theoretical perspective.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly considers CG disclosure policy
reforms in the UK. The following sections present the theoretical framework, review the
empirical literature and develop hypotheses, outline the research methodology and
discuss the findings of the paper. The concluding remarks of the paper are provided in the
final section.
2. Corporate governance, disclosure policy reforms and the UK corporate
context
Policymakers and shareholders became more concern about the need to improve and
reform CG practices in the UK at the end of 1980s when several corporate scandals
emerged (Waweru, 2014). This period was characterised by a weak link between corporate
financial performance and executive directors’ pay, limited role of auditors and rampant
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cases of expropriation of shareholders’ wealth by opportunistic managers (Pye, 2000). In
particular, a number of well-known corporate scandals, including the failure of the Barings
Bank, occurred (Waweru, 2014). These corporate scandals impaired significantly the
confidence of investors and were imputed mainly to weak CG practices involving lack of
accountability and transparency among senior corporate executives (Conyon and Mallin,
1997; Pass, 2006). Consequently, the Cadbury Committee was founded in 1991 with the
aim of promoting high standards of CG by enhancing accountability and transparency
practices in UK listed corporations. The Cadbury Committee issued its final report in 1992,
which has been an influential driver for CG reforms that have been pursued in different
countries worldwide (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). However, a notable limitation of
the Cadbury Report is that it focused mainly on the financial aspects of CG and neglected
other equally important aspects of governance, such as executive pay, risk management
and internal controls (Ntim et al., 2012a, 2012b).
Therefore, the recommendations contained in the Cadbury Report have been reviewed and
expanded by a number of predecessor reports (Greenbury, 1995; Hampel, 1998; Turnbull,
1999; Higgs, 2003; and Smith, 2003). For example and briefly, the 1995 Greenbury Report
sought to address the thorny issue of remuneration practices among UK listed corporations
with particular focus on improving the link between executive directors’ pay and
performance through increased disclosure of information relating to the pay of a company’s
executives. The 1998 Hampel Report consolidated the CG recommendations that were
contained in the 1992 Cadbury and 1995 Greenbury Reports, permitting its Committee to
issue the first UK Combined Code in 1998. The 1999 Turnbull Report sought to strengthen
the crucial issue of internal controls and risk management among UK listed corporations.
The 2003 Higgs Review focused on improving board independence by reviewing the role
and effectiveness of independent outside directors. Similarly, the 2003 Smith Report
focused on strengthening and reviewing the effectiveness of board subcommittees with
specific focus on the role and effectiveness of audit committees. The recommendations of
Higgs’ and Smith’s Reports were further consolidated with those of the 1998 Hampel’s
Report, leading to the issuance of the second version of the UK Combined Code in 2003.
The Combined Code has since been revised almost every two years, notably in 2006, 2008,
2010, 2012 and 2014 (FRC, 2010, 2012). Table I summarises and compares the main
recommendations contained in the different UK CG reforms that have been pursued over
the past 20 years with specific focus on the 1992 Cadbury Report and 2010 the Combined
Code.
Table I shows that most of CG recommendations contained in the UK codes/reports aim at
protecting the interests of shareholders. These CG recommendations cover five main
areas: board leadership; board effectiveness; board accountability; executive pay; and
relations with shareholders. The first two areas which relate to “board leadership” and
“effectiveness” seek to enhance the monitoring power and the independence of corporate
boards by requiring greater transparency regarding board practices, including separating
CEO and chairperson positions and requiring the chairperson of a firm’s board to be an
independent director, amongst others. CG rules relating to “accountability” seek to improve
risk management and control by requiring greater transparency about risk evaluation, risk
management policies and the presence of sufficient internal control and audit systems
aimed at determining and minimising managerial fraud. CG provisions relating to
“executive pay” aim to enhance monitoring and control over executive pay by calling for
higher disclosure and transparency about directors’ pay, such as disclosing information
about the components of executives’ pay and remuneration policy. “Relations with
shareholders” CG provisions seek to ensure that the top management team consider the
view of shareholders by encouraging continuous engagement, dialogue and
communication by corporate boards with major shareholders regarding issues relating to
governance, strategy and executive pay.
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Additional to the focus of good CG practices contained in 1992 Cadbury Report and the
2010 Combined Code on protecting shareholder interests, there are other CG regulations
that aim to protect the interests of stakeholders (e.g. 2002 Hermes-Principles and 2006
Companies-Act) by encouraging listed corporations to involve in more disclosure of
information relating to stakeholder CG practices. Furthermore, and as previously explained,
apart from sustained and extensive CG reforms that have been aimed at promoting high
standards of CG in listed corporations, UK firms are relatively characterised by disperse
ownership structure, where institutional shareholders play an important role in monitoring
boards and top management (Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012). Thus, the features of:
disperse ownership structure; strong shareholder activism; a good track record of adopting
and imposing corporate regulations; and active market for corporate, capital, service,
product and managerial control (Ferri and Maber, 2013; Melis et al., 2015) have the
capacity to encourage corporations to voluntarily comply with and disclose information
relating to their CG practices (MacNeil and Li, 2006; Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012). This
study, therefore, seeks to examine the extent to which UK listed firms voluntarily comply
with and disclose information relating to their CG practices and consequently, ascertain
whether observable cross-sectional differences in such voluntary CG disclosures can be
explained by ownership and board characteristics with specific focus on the period
following the 2007/2008 global financial crisis.
3. A neo-institutional theoretical perspective and CG disclosure practices
Although the notion of “institution” has been viewed in diverse approaches (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1991; Scott, 2001), it generally points out to norms and regulations that allow or
pose restrictions on the behaviours of actors to make their social life more significant
(Judge et al., 2010). The institutional theoretical framework is considered to be useful in
explaining the influence of higher-level environment on lower-level institutions (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1991).
The neo-institutional theoretical perspective suggested by Scott (2001) focuses on three
levels of analysis, including societal institutions (it also refers to global institutions),
institutional governance framework and actors in institutional settings. The societal
institutions provide the institutional context, where what is regarded to be acceptable
means/models is proposed and enacted (Judge et al., 2010; Scott, 2001). Such institutions
can affect lower-level institutions by shaping, constraining and promoting structures at
lower levels. At the middle level of model proposed by Scott is institutional governance
structures, which consist of organisational fields (refer to corporations working in identical
field, as indicated by providing services of similar nature), as well as of organisations
themselves. The organisational level of analysis is also considered to be important, as
corporations are diverse in size, complexity, structure and culture and they all affect and
are affected by their institutional environments and organisational fields. Finally, actors in
institutional settings are at the lowest level of the model proposed by Scott, comprising
individuals/groups.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991) recognised three forms of institutional pressures within
the bounds of neo-institutional theoretical framework. Briefly, the first type is “coercive or
regulative”, which refers to the existence of institutions that can compel and/or influence
actors to comply with CG practices. In our case, it refers, for example, to pressures of
regulations and laws emanating from London Stock Exchange (LSE) and Financial
Reporting Council (FRC) to comply with and disclose information relating to CG practices.
The second type is “cognitive or mimetic”, which refers to the ability of actors to learn and
copy the behaviour of other actors. This essentially suggests that a corporation might
imitate others when complying with good CG practices. The final type of pressure is
“normative”, which refers to expected and accepted behaviours within a social system.
This indicates that complying with good CG practices may become a norm after a whilst,
and every corporation will comply with the code of good CG practices. Scott (2001)
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suggests that each of these three types of institutional pressures affect and can be affected
by the forces of diffusion and also by the enforcement of institutional values and practices.
These forces and constraints interplay to create similarities in processes, procedures,
thoughts, structures and actions within institutional framework (“institutional isomorphism”).
Neo-institutional theoretical perspective has been used by prior studies at the national-level
to explain the antecedents, which simulate/constrain the diffusion of a several corporate
practices, including the adoption of international accounting practices (Maroun and Van
Zijl, 2015), CSR practices (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013), CG legitimacy (Judge et al., 2010)
and the compliance with the recommendations of CG codes/standards (Adegbite, 2015;
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). However, this theory has
hardly been used at the firm-level to examine issues relating to CG practices. Hence, this
study aims to extend, as well as contribute to, the existing literature by using
neo-institutional (“efficiency and legitimation views”) perspective to understand and explain
differences (at the firm-level of analysis) in CG practices.
In this regard, and from economic perspective, institutional scholars argue that institutions
are important in determining the forces, which encourage society’s members (e.g.
individuals, nations and companies) to get involve in profitable activities, including
maximising shareholder wealth (Judge et al., 2010). Based on the economic approach of
institutional theory, organisations primarily compete for resources (“economic efficiency”)
to maximise their self-interests. Therefore, and from efficiency-led perspective,
neo-institutional theory proposes that institutional pressures (i.e. coercive, mimetic and
normative) can be a strategic attempt to gain competitive advantages. In this case,
involving in good CG can improve efficiency by gaining access to the critical resources
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Additionally, committing to good CG practices can improve
efficiency by reducing the agency/information asymmetry problems (Abdioglu et al., 2015;
Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
In contrast, and from sociological perspective, Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that
corporations do not only aim to provide goods and services and make profit; they also have
responsibilities towards the larger society. Organisations, based on sociological
perspective, gain their authority to operate from the larger society, and thus, they are also
accountable to the larger society for their activities. For firms to survive, they need to
legitimise their operation through conforming to socially expected and accepted
standards/conventions (Suchman, 1995). Additionally, firms need to consider not only the
rights of shareholders but also the rights of the wider society (Ramanathan, 1976).
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), the legitimacy and eventually the survival of
firms can be threatened, if firms failed to conform to socially expected and accepted
standards/conventions. Thus, from the sociological perspective, organisations not only
strive to gain access to the critical resources, but they eventually desire to achieve social
legitimacy and acceptance (Judge et al., 2010; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). Consistent with
this perspective, CG system is deemed to be a crucial mechanism that ensures conforming
to societal expectations. In particular, the legitimation-led perspective of neo-institutional
theory suggests that firms need to commit to high levels of voluntary disclosure of
information relating to stakeholder CG practices to legitimise their operations and survive
(Reverte, 2009).
4. Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure: literature review and
hypotheses development
A number of factors have been identified by prior studies, which can impact on engaging
in good CG practices (Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Barako et al., 2006; Hussainey and
Al-Najjar, 2012; Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et al. 2012b; Ntim et al., 2015a, 2015b).
This study draws from this literature and the UK corporate context to identify possible
antecedents of voluntary compliance with and disclosure of, good CG practices. In
particular, this study explores the impact of firm-level CG quality in the form of board
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characteristics (i.e. board size, the proportion of independent outside directors, board
diversity and the existence of a separate CG committee) and ownership structure variables
(i.e. managerial ownership, institutional ownership and block ownership) on voluntary CG
compliance and disclosure practices among UK listed firms.
4.1 Corporate board characteristics
4.1.1 Corporate board size. Board size refers to the number of both inside and outside
directors that serve on a corporate board. The efficiency view of neo-institutional theoretical
framework proposes that larger boards are characterised by better decision-making and
higher managerial monitoring (Ntim, 2015). This is because larger boards are less likely to
be controlled by powerful chief executives in comparison with smaller boards (Ntim and
Soobaroyen, 2013), and as such, strategic decisions, including those relating to voluntary
disclosure of CG practices, can be scrutinised more effectively by larger boards.
Therefore, as CG information becomes an important component of corporate voluntary
disclosure, it is expected that corporations with larger boards are more likely to involve in
increased disclosure of information relating to their CG practices compared with
corporations with smaller boards. Similarly, and from a legitimisation neo-institutional
theoretical perspective, larger boards considered to be more efficient in scrutinising and
detecting opportunistic behaviours of managers (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). This is because
larger boards are often characterised by greater diversity in terms of experience, financial
expertise and stakeholders’ representation, as well as capabilities to solve problems, which
can improve firm reputation and image (Ntim, 2015). The greater diversity of stakeholders
linked to larger boards may also increase the need of corporations to voluntarily disclosure
information relating to their CG practices, and thus, larger boards are expected to
voluntarily commit to greater CG disclosures than their smaller counterparts.
In contrast, Ciampi (2015) and John and Senbet (1998) advocate the view that smaller
boards are more effective in scrutinising managerial opportunism, whereas larger boards
are associated with coordination and communication problems among their members
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992), and thus, the implication of this is that as board’s size increases,
there is a greater possibility that managers’ monitoring will decrease. Arguably, this can
increase the possibility that larger boards may be controlled by powerful chief executives
and, thus, can influence adversely corporate voluntary disclosure behaviours, including
those relating to CG practices.
Notwithstanding the conflicting theoretical literature, however, a clear majority of prior
empirical literature find a positive link among board size and corporate disclosure practices
(Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Barako et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2012b; Ntim et al., 2015b). In
contrast, there are other studies report that board size impacts negatively on corporate
disclosure behaviour (Samaha et al., 2012). Other studies did not find any link between
board size and corporate disclosure practices (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). In the UK
context, prior studies (Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012) find a
positive link between board size and voluntary CG disclosure practices. In addition, the
2010 UK Combined Code indicates that the board should be of a sufficient size to ensure
that it is able to operate effectively (FRC, 2010; Higgs-Report, 2003), and therefore, it can
be expected that board size may have an impact on voluntary CG compliance and
disclosure practices. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:
H1. Larger boards tend to engage in greater compliance with, and disclosure of, good
CG practices than smaller boards.
4.1.2 Proportion of independent outside directors. From a neo-institutional (efficiency view)
theoretical perspective, the appointment of independent outside directors is deemed to be
one of the important governance mechanism that can facilitate effective monitoring of
boards, thereby help in reducing inherent agency problems between executives and
shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Similarly, neo-institutional theory (legitimation
view) suggests that the split of ownership from control may lead to increase the lack of trust
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between agents and owners, which may have negative implications for the legitimacy of
managerial decisions (Adegbite, 2015). However, Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) suggest
that such legitimacy concerns can be minimised by appointing independent outside
directors, who act as representative of different groups of stakeholders. Therefore, the
presence of independent outside directors may not only enhance efficiency for
shareholders by mitigating agency conflicts but also enhance legitimacy by taking into
account the interests of different groups of stakeholder. Additionally, independent outside
directors tend to bring greater diversity to corporate boards, including knowledge, skills
and business contacts (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Thus, the appointment of
independent outside directors can influence positively the level CG disclosure practices by
putting greater pressure on corporate executives to be more transparent about their CG
practices.
Empirically, the findings of empirical literature largely suggest a positive link among the
presence of independent outside directors and CG disclosure practices. For instance, and
in line with the findings of previous studies (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Samaha and
Dahawy, 2011), Samaha et al. (2012) report a positive relationship between the proportions
of outside executives and voluntary disclosure about CG practices. A limited number of
evidence, however, suggest a negative relationship between the proportions of outside
directors and corporate disclosure behaviour (Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2014; Barako et
al., 2006). With respect to the UK corporate context, Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) report that
the association between the proportion of outside directors and voluntary CG disclosure
practices is positive. Additionally, the 2010 UK Combined Code (Section b.1.2) suggests
that at least half of corporate board should be independent outside directors. This implies
that the Combined Code considers the presence of independent outside directors on
corporate boards to be a good CG aspect and, therefore, can be expected to positively
influence CG compliance and disclosure practices. Thus, we propose the following
hypothesis:
H2. Boards with more independent outside directors tend to engage in greater
compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG practices than those with less
independent outside directors.
4.1.3 Corporate board diversity. The diversity of corporate board is deemed to be an
important components that can influence its performance (Carter et al., 2010; Upadhyay
and Zeng, 2014). Corporate board diversity can be defined using different attributes, such
as gender, age, professional background and ethnic origin (Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004).
Nevertheless, the majority of existing literature focused mainly on gender and ethnic
diversity aspects of the board, as they are easily observable and thus easier to
operationalise (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Adegbite, 2015; Carter et al., 2010; Ntim, 2015;
Upadhyay and Zeng, 2014). Therefore, this study focuses on these two aspects of board’s
diversity. From neo-institutional (“efficiency view”) perspective, the presence of women and
ethnic minorities on a firm’s board may improve its performance/efficiency (Brammer et al.,
2007; Upadhyay and Zeng, 2014), by linking the firm to its external environment and that
may allow access to crucial resources (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Similarly, and from
neo-institutional (“legitimation view”) perspective, the presence of women and ethnic
minorities on a firm’s board may improve its legitimacy by providing better networks with
influential stakeholders (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Furthermore, gender and ethnic
diversity can enhance board independence from management by having members from
diverse gender and ethnic origins (Barako and Brown, 2008), which can improve the ability
of the board to effectively monitor self-serving managers from expropriating shareholder
wealth (Carter et al., 2010; Upadhyay and Zeng, 2014). Thus, and given that the extent of
voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices is primarily determined by corporate
executives and owners (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013), it is expected that more diverse
boards can put greater pressure on senior managers (especially from female and ethnic
minority members) to involve in greater compliance and disclosure of good CG practices
than their less diverse counterparts.
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Empirical studies examining the influence of board diversity on voluntary CG disclosure are
generally rare (Barako and Brown, 2008; Brammer et al., 2007; Ntim and Soobaroyen,
2013) and, thus, offers a good opportunity to contribute to the extant literature. The results
of these studies suggest that board diversity impacts positively on corporate disclosure
practices. Within the European corporate context in general, and UK in particular,
increasing attention is being paid towards improving the governance of large public
corporations by encouraging greater involvement of women and Black, Asian and Minority
Ethnic (BAME) groups in top management. In particular, Section b.2 of 2010 UK Combined
Code recommends that corporations should ensure that their boards are sufficiently
diverse in a number of aspects that can impact on their effectiveness, including age,
experience, skills, gender and ethnicity. Thus, board diversity is viewed as a positive CG
aspect by the UK Combined Code, which can be expected to impact positively on
voluntary CG disclosure. Hence, we propose the following hypothesis:
H3. Boards with more women and ethnic minorities tend to engage in greater
compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG practices than those with less women
and ethnic minorities.
4.1.4 The existence of a separate CG committee. The 2010 UK Combined Code does not
require UK listed firms to establish a separate CG committee to monitor whether they
comply with the requirements of the recommended CG provisions contained in it.
Consequently, it has been suggested that corporations that voluntarily establish a separate
CG committee to closely monitor their compliance with the CG code are expected to
involve in good governance practices and, thus, voluntarily provide more information
relating to their CG practices compared with their counterparts that do not have a separate
CG committee (Ntim et al., 2012b). Therefore, it is predicted that corporations that have a
separate CG committee to closely monitor their compliance are more likely to involve in
good CG practices to enhance their legitimacy and also gain the support of key
stakeholders, to access crucial resources, including capital and contacts.
Empirically, there are few studies that have examined the link among the existence of
separate CG committees and voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices, and
therefore, this makes it an interesting area for investigation. Ntim et al. (2012a) find a
positive link among the existence of a separate CG committees and the voluntary CG
compliance and disclosure practices for listed corporations in South Africa. This study,
therefore, expect that corporations that voluntarily establish separate CG committees to
disclose engage in greater CG compliance and disclosure compared with their
counterparts with no CG committees. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
H4. Boards that set up a separate CG committee tend to engage in greater compliance
with, and disclosure of, good CG practices than those with no separate CG
committees.
4.2 Ownership structure mechanisms
4.2.1 Managerial ownership. From neo-institutional (efficiency view) perspective,
managerial ownership can help mitigate agency conflicts by aligning management
interests with those of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Similarly, and from a
legitimisation perspective, firms with high managerial ownership have limited pressure to
demonstrate accountability and transparency to outsiders, including the general public
(Khan et al., 2013). Consequently, firms with high managerial ownership are expected to
invest less in CG activities because the costs of investing in such activities may exceed the
expected benefits (Samaha et al., 2012), and therefore, a limited need to voluntarily engage
in increased disclosure of CG practices.
By contrary, it is argued that higher ownership by managers may not necessarily result in
aligning management and shareholder interests, because managers may behave
opportunistically by exploiting insider information to maximise their own benefits at the
expense of other shareholders (Chen and Al-Najjar, 2012; McConnell and Servaes, 1990).
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Thus, as ownership by managers increases, there is a greater possibility that their
monitoring will decrease, which may impact negatively on voluntary CG compliance and
disclosure practices.
The findings of prior empirical studies support the argument that directors who own
substantial portion of their firms’ shares impact negatively on the level of voluntary
disclosures (Khan et al., 2013). With respect to the UK context, prior empirical studies
report that corporations with higher managerial ownership tend to disclose less information
relating to their CG practices than their counterparts with lower managerial ownership
(Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012). This leads us to propose the following hypothesis:
H5. Firms with lower managerial ownership tend to engage in greater compliance with,
and disclosure of, good CG practices than those with higher managerial ownership.
4.2.2 Institutional ownership. It is suggested that institutional shareholder actively engage
in promoting the fast diffusion of codes of good CG practices worldwide (Ntim et al.,
2012b). From a neo-institutional (efficiency view) perspective, institutional shareholders
play an active role in reducing agency conflicts in public corporations (Shleifer and Vishny,
1986). One reason is that institutional shareholders tend to have relatively higher ownership
stakes than individual shareholders, and therefore, they inherently have more incentives to
monitor more closely managerial opportunistic behaviour than their smaller counterparts
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Additionally, neo-institutional (legitimation view) theory
suggests that institutional shareholders who have significant stakes in public corporations
enjoy several advantages over small shareholders, including financial, information
gathering and processing, knowledge, skills and expertise advantages (Ciampi, 2015).
Thus, as powerful corporate stakeholders, institutional shareholders can exert more
influence on a number of corporate decisions, including decisions on appointing directors
and disclosure practices (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012). Therefore, the presence of
institutional shareholders can impact positively on the voluntary CG compliance and
disclosure practices.
Empirically, majority of prior studies report that corporations with higher institutional
ownership tend to disclose more information relating to their CG practices than their
counterparts with lower institutional ownership (Ntim et al., 2012b; Samaha et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, few studies have also reported no association between institutional
ownership and the level of voluntary disclosures (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Within the
UK corporate context, the findings of Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012) and Mallin and
Ow-Yong (2012) suggest that institutional shareholders is related positively to the voluntary
CG disclosure. Similarly, 2010 Stewardship Code and 2010 UK Combined Code explicitly
encourage institutional investors to actively engage in enhancing compliance with, and
disclosure of, good CG practices among UK listed firms. This leads us to propose the
following hypothesis:
H6. Firms with higher institutional ownership tend to engage in greater compliance with,
and disclosure of, good CG practices than those with lower institutional ownership.
4.2.3 Block ownership. From neo-institutional (efficiency view) perspective, corporations
with concentrated ownership are less likely to comply with good CG standards (Chen and
Al-Najjar, 2012; Patel et al., 2002), because blockholders tend to have unrestricted access
to insider information directly from managers rather than through corporate disclosure
media, such as annual reports (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Concentrated ownership is,
therefore, associated with less information asymmetry, which can mitigate agency
problems (Reverte, 2009) and, thus, a reduced need for voluntary CG disclosures. In
essence, block ownership can effectively serve as an alternative mechanism for good CG,
including voluntary CG disclosure practices (Bozec and Bozec, 2007). Similarly,
neo-institutional theory from a legitimisation perspective indicates that firms with
concentrated ownership tend to have less external pressure to demonstrate public
accountability (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Samaha et al., 2012), which can impact
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negatively on the level of voluntary CG disclosures. By contrast, greater information
asymmetry and agency problems often associated with disperse ownership can be
addressed by managerial commitment to engage in increased disclosure, including
disclosing more information relating to their CG practices (Melis et al., 2015; Reverte,
2009). Thus, the theoretical expectation is that corporations with concentrated ownership
structures are more likely disclose information relating to their CG practices compared with
their counterparts with dispersed ownership.
Empirically, the existing empirical evidence is largely consistent with the prediction that
ownership concentration impacts negatively on voluntary CG disclosures. For instance,
and consistent with the evidence provided by previous literature (Bozec and Bozec, 2007;
Samaha and Dahawy, 2011), Samaha et al. (2012) find that higher ownership concentration
is associated negatively with the disclosure of CG information among Egyptian listed firms.
With reference to the UK corporate context, the findings Melis et al. (2015) indicate that
ownership concentration impacts negatively on voluntary CG disclosure practices. Hence,
we propose the following hypothesis:
H7. Firms with high block ownership tend to engage in less compliance with, and
disclosure of, good CG practices than those with less block ownership.
5. Research design
5.1 Data collection procedure
To investigate the voluntary CG compliance and disclosure among UK listed corporations,
and consequently determine whether board characteristics and ownership structure
variables can explain observable differences in the extent to which the UK listed firms
voluntarily engage in greater compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG practices, all
non-financial listed corporations on the main market of LSE for years 2008-2013 were
sampled. As firm size and industry type (Cooke, 1992) are expected to affect CG
compliance and disclosure practices, the selection of our final sample took into account
firm size and industry distributions. There were a total of 612 non-financial listed firms[2] on
the LSE as at the end of 31 December 2013. Listed firms have to meet three main
specifications to be included to the study’s final sample:
1. the annual reports of the listed corporations need to be available for the years from
2008 to 2013;
2. a firm’s financial and market performance data have to be available for all six years
investigated; and
3. the firm has to maintain continuous listing over the six years investigated.
The above-mentioned three specifications were used for these reasons. First, consistent
with prior literature (Ntim et al., 2012a, b), these specifications allowed conforming to the
conditions of balanced panel data analysis. There are several benefits from using balanced
panel data, including increasing degrees of freedom and reducing collinearity problem
(Wooldridge, 2013). Second, combining time-series and cross-section data can allow
ascertaining if the observable cross-sectional relationship among voluntary CG
compliance/disclosure, board and ownership mechanisms also remains the same over
time. Third, the sampling period starts in 2008, because the 2007/2008 financial crisis has
increased debate surrounding the effectiveness of CG and disclosure practices, and thus,
the current study may offer insights on the extent to which the recent financial crisis has
affected CG structures and disclosure practices among UK listed corporations. The
sampling period ends in 2013 because it was the latest year for which the annual reports
of listed corporations were published when the data collection started. Data relating to
board characteristics, ownership structure variables and voluntary CG compliance and
disclosure practices were collected manually from the annual reports of the examined
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sample. Those reports were downloaded from corporations’ websites and Perfect
Information, whereas the DataStream was used to collect the financial data.
5.2 Variables measurement and regression model
Table II summarises all variables used in conducting the empirical analyses of current
study. First, and as presented in Table II, our main dependent variable is a broad UK CG
index (UKCGI), which contains 120 CG provisions covering five sections of the 2010 UK
Combined Code: board leadership (LSH); board effectiveness (ETIV); board accountability
(ACNT); executive pay (REM); and relations with shareholders (RWS). We constructed our
UKCGI by given “1” if any of the 120 CG provisions included in the UKCGI is disclosed and
“0” otherwise[3]. Following this widely used binary coding scheme, a firm’s total disclosure
score in a certain company-year may range between 0 and 120, which is expressed as a
percentage ranging from 0 (perfect non-compliance and disclosure) to 100 per cent
(perfect compliance and disclosure) with higher index scoring, suggesting better CG
compliance and disclosure practices[4].
We adopted an un-weighted coding scheme for several reasons. First, unlike the weighted
coding scheme, this approach enables us to avoid making judgement to assign a particular
Table II Variables definition and measurement
Corporate governance disclosures variables–quality/level measure (compliance and disclosure index)
UKCGI CG compliance and disclosure index constituting 120 CG provisions extracted from the 2010 Combined Code which
assigns a value of 1 if disclosure is made in the annual reports of firms and 0 otherwise. This then is scaled to a value
ranging between 0 and 100%
LSH Sub-index of UKCGI related to board’s leadership consisting of eight provisions that is awarded a value of 1 if
disclosure is made in the annual reports of firms about each of the eight provisions and 0 otherwise. This then is
scaled to a value ranging between 0 and 100%
ETIV Sub-index of UKCGI related to the effectiveness of corporate board consisting of 37 provisions that is awarded a
value of 1 if disclosure is made in the annual reports of firms about each of the 37 provisions and 0 otherwise. This
then is scaled to a value ranging between 0 and 100%
ACNT Sub-index of UKCGI related to board’s accountability consisting of 36 provisions that is awarded a value of 1 if
disclosure is made in the annual reports of firms about each of the 36 provisions and 0 otherwise. This then is scaled
to a value ranging between 0 and 100%
REM Sub-index of UKCGI related to executive pay consisting of 22 provisions that is awarded a value of 1 if disclosure is
made in the annual reports of firms about each of the 22 provisions and 0 otherwise. This then is scaled to a value
ranging between 0 and 100%
RWS Sub-index of UKCGI related to relations with shareholders consisting of 17 provisions that is awarded a value of 1 if
disclosure is made in the annual reports of firms about each of the 17 provisions and 0 otherwise. This then is scaled
to a value ranging from 100 to 0%
Board and ownership characteristics variables
BSE Natural log of the number of inside and outside directors
IOE Number of independent outside directors divided by the number of corporate board members
BDG Number of women divided by the number of corporate board members
BDE Number of ethnic minority divided by the number of corporate board members
BD Number of women and ethnic minority divided by the number of corporate board members
PCGC 1, if a corporation set up a separate CG committee, 0 otherwise
MANO Percentage of all directors’ ownership to total firm ordinary shareholdings
ISTO Percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders to total firm ordinary shareholdings
BLKO Percentage of block ownership with at least 3% of the total firm ordinary shareholdings
Control variables
LTA Natural log of total assets of a firm
LAG Natural log of firm age in years
CEX Total capital expenditure divided by total assets
SG Sales of this year minus the sales of previous year to the sales of the previous year
GR Total debt divided by total assets
Q Book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus market value of equity to the book value of total assets
IDU A dummy variable for each of the five industries: basic material and oil and gas (BM&OG), consumer goods
(CGODS), consumer services and healthcare (CSER&HCARE), industrial (INDUSTR) and technology and
communication (TECH&COMUN)
YDU Dummy variables for the years 2008-2013
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provision because it assumes that all provisions are equally important (Botosan, 1997). This
suggests that the un-weighted coding scheme enables us to avoid a situation where the
same provision could be weighted differently by different user groups (Owusu-Ansah,
1998). Second, there is no agreed theoretical background on the weight that should be
assigned to different CG provisions, and thus, our decision to use the un-weighted coding
scheme avoids making a bias judgment towards one or a set of CG provisions as it is often
the case with the use of weighted coding scheme (Barako et al., 2006). Third, the evidence
provided by previous literature indicates that both weighted and un-weighted coding
schemes lead to similar results, especially in cases, where the number of disclosure items
is large (Barako et al., 2006). This is empirically supported in our study (i.e. Model 1 of
Table VII), as we find that both schemes (i.e. using weighted or un-weighted index) lead to
similar results. Finally, the use of binary scoring scheme is based on a rigorously developed
theoretical and empirical literature (Barako et al., 2006; Collett and Hrasky, 2005; Khan et
al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2012a, 2012b; Samaha et al., 2012), and therefore, this can facilitate
comparisons with those studies[5].
Second, board and ownership mechanisms are our main independent variables. Board
mechanisms, include corporate board size (BSE), the proportion of independent outside
directors (IOE), board gender diversity (BDG), board ethnic diversity (BDE), board diversity
based on both gender and ethnicity (BD) and the existence of a separate CG committee
(PCGC), whereas ownership mechanisms include managerial ownership (MANO),
institutional ownership (ISTO) and block ownership (BLKO). Finally, and to account for
omitted variables bias, the study controls for several variables, including firm size (LTA),
firm age (LAG), capital expenditure (CEX), sales growth (SG), gearing (GR), profitability
(Q), industry (IDU) and year variables (YDU). For brevity purposes, this study has not
developed specific hypotheses among each of the control variables and the UKCGI;
however, there is a well-established evidence, which indicates that these variables can
impact on voluntary CG disclosures (Cooke, 1992; Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et al.,
2012b). Based on the above seven hypotheses, the following model is proposed and with
the aim to be tested using the ordinary least square (OLS):
UKCGIit  0  1BSEit  2IOEit  3BDit  4PCGCit  5MANOit  6ISTOit
 7BLKOit  
i1
n
iCONTSit  it
where UKCGI is the UK CG compliance and disclosure index; BSE is board size; IOE is the
proportion of independent outside directors; BD refers to board diversity based on both
gender and ethnicity; PCGC is the existence of a separate CG committee; MANO refers to
managerial ownership; ISTO is defined as institutional ownership; BLKO is block
ownership; and CONTS points out to the set of variables being controlled, namely, firm size
(LTA), firm age (LAG), capital expenditure (CEX), sales growth (SG), gearing (GR),
profitability (Q), five industry dummies (IDU) and six-year dummies (YDU).
6. Empirical findings
6.1 Descriptive analysis and bivariate correlations
Panel “A” of Table III reports the descriptive analysis of data relating to the level of
compliance with CG practices and its five sub-indices over the six years investigated
(2008-2013). Crucially, the distribution of the UKCGI varies substantially, ranging from 20
(24 out from 120 provisions disclosed) to 94.17 per cent (113 out from 120) with the mean
(median) corporation complying with 61.73 per cent (64.58 per cent) of the 120 CG
provisions investigated. Similarly, the distribution of the five UKCGI’s sub-indices differs
substantially. For example, the board leadership sub-index (LSH) ranges between 12.50
and 100 per cent, with the average corporation complying with 79.35 per cent of the eight
CG provisions examined. With respect to the other sub-indices of the UKCGI, overall the
levels of CG compliance and disclosure practices among the UK investigated corporations
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vary substantially, implying that differences exist between the level of compliance and
disclosure with the summary UKCGI and its five sub-indices. In general, it can be observed
that in spite of the expectation that the development of the UK Combined Code will
speed-up the adoption of good CG standards, there is still substantial variation in the
governance practices among the UK publicly listed corporations. Although, this is in line
with the evidence provided by previous studies (Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Mallin and
Ow-Yong, 2012; Melis et al., 2015), it indicates that there is a substantial degree of variation
Table III Summary statistics
Variables Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum
High – Low UKCGI
Mean
difference
Median
difference
Panel A: the UKCGI based on all 600 firm-years
UKCGI (%) 61.73 64.58 14.53 20.00 94.17 – –
LSH (%) 79.35 87.50 18.02 12.50 100.0 – –
ETIV (%) 59.01 64.86 18.33 13.51 91.89 – –
ACNT (%) 52.94 52.78 12.86 11.11 97.22 – –
REM (%) 77.58 81.82 15.00 4.55 100.0 – –
RWS (%) 57.50 58.82 22.71 5.88 100.0 – –
Panel B: Firms with high UKCGI
UKCGI (%) 71.91 72.50 6.01 62.50 94.20 – –
LSH (%) 75.36 75.00 16.89 13.00 100.0 – –
ETIV (%) 52.55 56.76 17.01 13.51 83.78 – –
ACNT (%) 48.41 50.00 10.82 11.11 75.00 – –
REM (%) 74.38 77.27 12.42 40.91 90.91 – –
RWS (%) 48.40 47.06 22.08 5.88 94.12 – –
Panel C: Firms with low UKCGI
UKCGI (%) 47.77 50.83 10.69 20.0 61.67 – –
LSH (%) 84.83 87.50 18.10 25.0 100.0 – –
ETIV (%) 67.87 70.27 16.28 18.92 91.89 – –
ACNT (%) 59.15 61.11 12.86 13.89 97.22 – –
REM (%) 81.96 86.36 17.03 4.55 100.0 – –
RWS (%) 69.98 64.71 16.91 35.29 100.0 – –
Panel D: Independent (Board and ownership characteristics) variables
BSE 9.00 8.00 3.46 3.00 18.00 2.30*** 3.00***
IOE (%) 59.11 60.00 17.66 10.00 92.86 17.12*** 19.23***
BDG (%) 10.27 10.00 10.42 0.00 50.00 3.66*** 11.11***
BDE (%) 1.37 0.00 3.98 0.00 25.00 0.56* 0.00***
BD (%) 11.65 11.11 11.40 0.00 50.00 4.22*** 7.45***
PCGC (%) 14.33 0.00 35.07 0.00 100.0 7.70*** 0.00***
MANO (%) 5.95 0.58 11.40 0.005 52.37 9.40*** 2.67***
ISTO (%) 38.38 36.38 20.70 3.07 97.49 8.14*** 6.97***
BLKO (%) 42.62 43.20 21.55 3.07 98.08 17.81*** 19.06***
Panel E: Control variables
TA(£m) 17,743.64 431.25 41,859.28 0.983 274,507.71 8,140.76** 3,457.49***
AG 58.19 38.00 46.59 3.00 199.00 2.73 4.00
CEX (%) 4.99 3.70 4.14 0.42 14.73 0.26 0.65
SG (%) 7.61 5.65 18.60 23.77 52.04 0.99 5.22
GR (%) 21.29 18.98 14.82 1.57 53.20 9.45*** 10.07***
Q 0.54 0.56 0.23 0.01 1.66 0.10*** 0.15***
Notes: Variables of the study are described as follows: the UK CG compliance and disclosure index (UKCGI); leadership sub-index
(LSH); effectiveness sub-index (ETIV); accountability sub-index (ACNT); remuneration sub-index (REM); relations with shareholders
sub-index (RWS); board size (BSE); the proportion of independent outside directors (IOE); board diversity based on gender (BDG);
board ethnic diversity (BDE); board gender and ethnicity diversity (BD); existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC); managerial
ownership (MANO); institutional ownership (ISTO); block ownership (BLKO); firm size (LTA); firm age (LAG); capital expenditure (CEX);
sales growth (SG); gearing (GR); and profitability (Q). The mean/median differences for the sampled corporations are presented in the
last two columns; ***; ** and; *imply significance of the mean and median differences between corporations with high CG ranking (i.e.
corporations having a UKCGI score higher than 61.73% value); and (ii) corporations with low CG ranking (i.e. corporations having a
UKCGI score lower than 61.73% value) at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively
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regarding the importance that UK listed firms attach to compliance and disclosure of good
governance practices.
Further, Panels “D” and “E” of Table III present the descriptive analysis for all other
variables. Overall, both Panels show wide variations for all the variables under examination.
For example, board size (BSE) is between 3 and 18 with a median of 8 board members.
Additionally, and similar to the findings of prior studies (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012;
Veprauskaite˙; and Adams, 2013), institutional ownership (ISTO) and block ownership
(BLKO) range from 3.07 to of 97.49 per cent, 98.08 per cent with a mean of 36.38 and 43.20
per cent, respectively. Board diversity (BD) based on both gender and ethnicity ranges
between 0 and 50 per cent with an average of 11.65 per cent, suggesting that the average
UK listed corporation’s board is dominated by white males. Board ethnic diversity (BDE) is,
observably, low ranging from 0 to 25 per cent with a median (mean) of 0 per cent (1.37 per
cent). Evidence of low ethnic and gender diversity in UK boardrooms are largely consistent
with those provided of prior UK empirical studies (Brammer et al., 2007; Singh and
Vinnicombe, 2004). With reference to the remaining variables, including the proportion of
independent outside directors (IOE), board gender diversity (BDG), managerial ownership
(MANO), the existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC) and the control variables, the
findings suggest that there is adequate variation in them. Thus, our findings suggest that
our sample has been carefully chosen, thereby minimising any possibilities of sample
selection bias.
To make further informative inferences about our data, the sample is divided into two
groups:
1. corporations with high CG ranking (corporations having a UKCGI score higher than the
mean/median value); and
2. corporations with low CG ranking (corporations having a UKCGI score lower than the
mean/median value).
The results of the t-test comparing the “mean” and “median” differences for the board/
ownership and control variables are presented in Table III under Columns 7 and 8. Overall,
the findings suggest that there is a substantial variation in terms of the mean and median
between the two groups. For instance, the mean is significantly different between
corporations with high CG scores and those with low CG scores as follows: the presence
of independent outside directors (17.12); board gender diversity (3.66); board gender and
ethnicity diversity (4.22); the existence of a separate CG committee (7.70); managerial
ownership (9.40); institutional ownership (8.14); and block ownership (17.81). The
results imply that corporations with larger boards, more independent outside directors,
more diverse boards, and which have a separate CG committee engage in greater
compliance with, and disclosure of, CG practices. By contrary, corporations with
concentrated ownership and high managerial and institutional ownership commit to low CG
disclosures.
Table IV reports the results of correlation matrices for all variables used in this study to
examine the presence of multicollinearities among the variables. The coefficients of both
Pearson’s and Spearman’s are provided as a robustness check, and noticeably, the
direction and the magnitude of coefficients reported in both correlation matrices are fairly
the same, indicating non-existence of serious non-normality problems. Further, the
coefficients of both correlation matrices suggest that the levels of correlation among
variables used in the current study are relatively weak, indicating non-existence of serious
multicollinearity problems. Additionally, the values of variance inflation factor (VIF), which is
reported in Table V, do not exceed 10, indicating that there is no serious multicollinearity
problems (Field, 2009). We also examine the presence of heteroscedasticity in our model
using Breusch–Pagan test, and the p-value is 0.1779, indicating that heteroscedasticity is
not present in our model.
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Overall, and as hypothesised, Table IV suggests statistically significant association among
the UKCGI and all other variables. In line with our predictions, board size (BSE), the
proportion of independent outside directors (IOE), board diversity based on gender and
ethnicity (BD) and the existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC) are positively
associated with the UKCGI, whereas managerial (MANO) and block ownership (BLKO) are
significantly and negatively associated with the UKCGI. However, the results suggest that
corporations with higher institutional ownership (ISTO) tend to provide significantly less CG
information, which is not in line with our hypothesis. In terms of the control variables, the
evidence suggests that larger (LTA), older (LAG), profitable (Q), capital intensive (CEX)
and highly geared (GR) corporations disclose more CG information voluntarily, as
hypothesised. However, the evidence that sales’ growth (SG) has no significant association
with CG compliance and disclosure practices is not consistent with our hypothesis.
6.2 Regression analysis
Table V presents the findings relating the antecedents of CG compliance and disclosure
practices. Models 1, 2 and 3 report the findings of the OLS analysis of board characteristics
and ownership structure variables without the control variables on the UKCGI. In Models 4
and 5, board characteristics and ownership mechanisms are regressed on the UKCGI by
including control variables, respectively. Observably, the results reported in Model 6
generally indicate that the explanatory variables are significant in explaining
cross-sectional differences in the levels of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure
practices (UKCGI).
With respect to board characteristics; first, board size (BSE) is positively and significantly
linked to the UKCGI (0.095), thereby providing empirical support for H1. This is also
consistent with the findings of Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) and Ntim et al. (2012a, 2012b).
The evidence is also in line with the expectations of neo-institutional (legitimation view)
perspective, which suggest that larger boards are characterised by increasing stakeholder
representation and that can increase the need for voluntary disclosures to facilitate the
attraction of crucial resources from powerful stakeholders. Additionally, neo-institutional
(efficiency view) perspective suggests that larger boards are usually associated with
greater monitoring on management activities and that can impact positively on voluntary
CG disclosure practices.
Second, the proportion of independent outside directors (IOE) is significantly and positively
associated with the UKCGI (0.198); therefore, H2 is empirically supported. This indicates
that boards with more independent outside directors tend to disclose more information
relating to their CG practices than those with less independent outside directors.
Additionally, the positive and significant association between the proportions of outside
directors and voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices provides empirical
support to the findings of prior studies (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Mallin and Ow-Yong,
2012; Samaha et al., 2012). Theoretically (“efficiency and legitimation views”), the
appointment of independent directors can impact positively on voluntary CG disclosures
by enhancing corporate legitimacy and mitigating agency conflicts through increased
managerial monitoring.
Third, board gender and ethnicity diversity (BD) is significantly and positively associated
with the UKCGI (0.117), and thus, H3 is supported. Empirically, the our finding is consistent
with that of Barako and Brown (2008), who report a significant positive link among board
diversity and CG disclosure practices. The evidence is also in line with the predictions of
neo-institutional (“efficiency and legitimation views”) perspective, which proposes that
diversified boards (i.e. have more women and ethnic monitories) may place more pressure
on corporate executives to involve in good governance practices to enhance corporate
legitimacy, attract resources from powerful stakeholders and also improve the capability of
corporate board to monitor management activities more effectively and thereby can impact
positively on voluntary CG disclosure practices.
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Finally, the existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC) is found to have a positive, but
insignificant association with the UKCGI (0.015), implying that H4 is not empirically
supported. The evidence is also not consistent with the expectations of neo-institutional
theory (“legitimation view”), which suggests that corporations that voluntarily set up a
separate CG committees to closely monitor their compliance with governance rules and
regulations are more likely to comply with good CG standards to improve their legitimacy
and also obtain key stakeholders’ support to gain access crucial resources. Empirically, the
positive and insignificant association between PCGC and the UKCGI does not provide
support for the results of Ntim et al. (2012b). However, the insignificant link among the
PCGC and voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices is not surprising, because
only 8 per cent of the sampled firms have a separate CG committee; this result in small
cross-sectional variations of the PCGC among the examined firms.
With respect to ownership structure variables, the findings in Table V suggest that the
ownership structure variables have mixed influence in explaining cross-sectional
differences in the voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. Specifically,
managerial ownership (MANO) is significantly and negatively associated with the UKCGI
(0.277), thereby providing empirical support for H5. Similarly, block ownership (BLKO) is
found to impact negatively on the UKCGI (0.245), and thus, H7 is empirically supported.
These findings are consistent with the predictions of neo-institutional theory (“efficiency
view”), which suggests that corporations with increased managerial ownership and block
ownership are associated with less information asymmetry and agency problems, which
can impact negatively on voluntary CG disclosure practices (Bozec and Bozec, 2007).
Neo-institutional theory (“legitimation view”) also suggests that firms with concentrated
ownership tend to have less external pressure to demonstrate public accountability (Ntim
and Soobaroyen, 2013; Samaha et al., 2012), which can impact negatively on voluntary CG
disclosures. Empirically, the negative association among managerial ownership (MANO),
block ownership (BLKO) and the UKCGI provides support for similar findings of Bozec and
Bozec (2007), Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012), Ntim et al. (2012a, 2012b) and Ntim and
Soobaroyen (2013).
Institutional ownership (ISTO) is found to have a positive, but insignificant influence on the
UKCGI (0.045); thus, H6 is not empirically supported. Theoretically, the insignificant impact
of institutional ownership on the UKCGI does not support the predictions of neo-institutional
theory (“legitimation view”), which indicates that corporations with higher institutional
ownership have a greater need to demonstrate public accountability and transparency so
as to legitimise their operations, as well as gain access to critical resources. Empirically, the
insignificant association between institutional ownership and the UKCGI is not consistent
with the findings of Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012), Barako et al. (2006), Mallin and
Ow-Yong (2012) and Ntim et al. (2012b), who provide empirical evidence that institutional
ownership is associated positively with corporate voluntary disclosures. However, the
insignificant impact of institutional ownership may due to that institutional investors are
passive and ineffective in monitoring (Dong and Ozkan, 2008).
In terms of control variables, the coefficients on them in Model 6 of Table V generally
significant, for example, capital expenditure (CEX) and gearing (GR) are significantly and
positively associated with voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices, providing
empirical support to the results of Meek et al. (1995) and Ntim et al. (2012b). Discernibly,
other control variables, including sales growth (SG) and profitability (Q), have insignificant
relationship with voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. Our findings are
consistent with the results of prior studies, which find no association between these two
variables and voluntary CG disclosures (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012). The negative and
significant coefficient on firm size (LTA) empirically support the results of Melis et al. (2015)
and Waweru (2014), who report a negative association between firm size and voluntary CG
disclosure. Finally, the negative and insignificant coefficient on firm age (LAG) is
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inconsistent with the findings of Haque et al. (2011), who report a positive and significant
relationship between firm age and voluntary disclosure practices.
Generally, the findings of this study indicate that board characteristics and ownership
mechanisms impact significantly on voluntary CG disclosure practices. However, in Model
6, we measured board diversity based only on the overall proportion of women and ethnic
minorities on a corporate board. Therefore, it is possible that the association between
board diversity and the UKCGI may differ if we re-estimate Model 6 by replacing board
diversity based on gender and ethnicity with board gender (BDG) and board ethnicity
(BDE), separately. As shown in Model 1 of Table VI, board gender diversity is found to
impact positively on the UKCGI supporting the view that boards of diverse gender tend to
put greater pressure of top management to engage in greater compliance and disclosure
of CG practices to enhance board’s ability to monitor utility managers effectively (Carter
et al., 2010). Additionally, the evidence contained in Model 1 of Table VI shows that board
ethnic diversity (BDE) is negatively associated with the UKCGI. Evidence of negative
influence of BDE in the UK boardroom is largely consistent with their extremely low
representation (1.37 per cent, Table III), and this suggest that ethnic minorities have less
influence over their boards’ decisions, including CG disclosure (Carter et al., 2010;
Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015).
Our results indicate that the observed differences in our UKCGI can be justified by our
board and ownership variables. However, the UKCGI consists of five sub-indices, including
leadership (LSH), effectiveness (ETIV), accountability (ACNT), remuneration (REM) and
relations with shareholders (RWS). Therefore, it is possible for the relationship between the
board/ownership characteristics and the individual sub-indices to differ from that of the
main UKCGI. We, therefore, re-estimate Model 6 by replacing the UKCGI with the five
sub-indices and the findings are provided in Models 2 to 6 in Table VI.
The coefficients on board size, the proportion of independent outside directors, board
gender and ethnic diversity and the existence of a separate CG committee (with exception
of RWS sub-index) remain positively associated with the five sub-indices. Similarly, the
coefficient on institutional ownership (with exception of LSH and REM sub-indices) remains
positively associated with the rest three sub-indices. In contrast, the coefficient on
managerial ownership (MANO) and block ownership (BLKO) remain significantly and
negatively associated with the five sub-indices. Overall, the results provided in Models 2 to
6 of Table VI offer further empirical support for the findings presented in Models 6 of
Table V.
6.3 Further analyses
To examine the robustness of the obtained findings, additional tests have been carried out.
As have been explained, all 120 CG provision included in the UKCGI are equally weighted.
However, because the number of CG provisions included in each of the five sub-indices
differs, this lead to assigning different weights to our five sub-index: leadership (i.e. 8 CG
provisions); effectiveness (i.e. 37 CG provisions); accountability (i.e. 36 CG provisions);
executive pay (i.e. 22 CG provisions); and relations with shareholder (i.e. 17 CG
provisions). Therefore, to ensure that our findings are not sensitive to the weight being
assigned to the five sub-index, an alternative index, named “W-UKCGI” has been
constructed in which each of the five sub-indices is awarded equal weight of 20 per cent.
The results for the weighted UKCGI are presented in Model 1 of Table VII. Observably, the
findings stay almost the same as the results provided in Model 6 of Table V, thus indicating
that our results appear to be robust to whether a weighted or un-weighted CG disclosure
index is used.
Additionally, a number of previous studies suggest that some of corporate board
characteristics (e.g. board size) and ownership structure variables (e.g. managerial,
institutional and block ownership) have non-linear relationship with corporate voluntary
disclosures (Sun et al., 2015; Guest, 2009; Morck et al., 1988). To identify the existence of
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non-linear relationship between board size, managerial, institutional, block ownership and
the UKCGI, Model 6 in Table V has been re-estimated by adding the square root of board
size, managerial, institutional and block ownership. The findings are reported in Model 2 of
Table VII. With respect of board size, Model 2 exhibits that larger boards have a negative
and significant relationship with the voluntary CG disclosure, indicating that there is a
curvilinear relationship among board size and voluntary CG compliance and disclosure
practices. This evidence also supports the findings of Guest (2009), who reported similar
non-linear evidence.
Our findings presented in Models 2 of Table VII relating to the ownership variables
generally suggest the existence of non-linear associations between them and the UKCGI.
For example, and with respect to managerial ownership, the evidence suggests that
management becomes less entrenched at higher levels of ownerships but becomes more
entrenched as ownership of management decreases. This result is consistent with the
findings of Morck et al. (1988), who find that higher ownership by managers help to align
their interests with those of owners and that improves corporate performance.
Similarly, and with respect to institutional ownership, the evidence suggests that there is
non-linear relationship between institutional ownership and CG compliance and disclosure
practices. Additionally, the evidence contained in Model 2 of Table VII suggests that block
owners become more entrenched at higher levels of ownership, which is consistent with
theoretical suggestions that concentrated ownership is associated with less information
asymmetry, which can ultimately lead to a reduction in agency problems (Reverte, 2009),
Table VII Robustness analysis of antecedents of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG practices
(Model) W-UKCGI (1) Non-linearity (2) Lagged effects (3) 2SLS (4) Fixed-Effects (5)
Board mechanisms
BSE 0.079*** (0.000) 0.631*** (0.000) 0.110*** (0.008) 0.923*** (0.000) 0.099*** (0.000)
BSE2 – 0.136*** (0.000) – –
IOE 0.199*** (0.000) 0.178*** (0.000) 0.299*** (0.000) 2.144*** (0.000) 0.227*** (0.000)
BD 0.130*** (0.008) 0.109** (0.015) 0.121** (0.020) 9.224*** (0.000) 0.164** (0.000)
PCGC 0.002 (0.926) 0.004 (0.800) 0.020 (0.263) 0.060 (0.511) 0.009 (0.639)
Ownership mechanisms
MANO 0.308*** (0.000) 0.488*** (0.002) 0.301*** (0.000) 2.785*** (0.000) 0.430*** (0.000)
MANO2 – 0.764** (0.042) – – –
ISTO 0.031 (0.341) 0.184 (0.185) 0.038 (0.261) 1.592*** (0.000) 0.002 (0.948)
ISTO2 – 0.204 (0.159) – – –
BLKO 0.234*** (0.000) 0.471*** (0.002) 0.258*** (0.000) 0.616*** (0.000) 0.102*** (0.004)
BLKO2 – 0.755*** (0.000) – – –
Control variables
LTA 0.011*** (0.007) 0.004 (0.271) 0.020*** (0.000) 0.354*** (0.000) 0.014*** (0.005)
LAG 0.008 (0.145) 0.011** (0.024) 0.005 (0.408) 0.155*** (0.000) 0.050*** (0.000)
CEX 0.370*** (0.003) 0.357*** (0.001) 0.309** (0.019) 2.842*** (0.000) 0.348*** (0.000)
SG 0.012 (0.686) 0.019 (0.458) 0.017 (0.568) 0.507*** (0.000) -0.008 (0.596)
GR 0.102*** (0.006) 0.093*** (0.004) 0.089** (0.023) 1.044*** (0.000) 0.084** (0.018)
Q 0.007 (0.100) 0.038 (0.110) 0.024 (0.376) 0.690*** (0.000) 0.031 (0.175)
IDU Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YDU Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.681*** 0.296** 0.697*** 3.637*** 0.270***
Durbin–Wu test 2.059 1.855 1.910 1.965 1.959
F-value 21.041*** 29.655*** 25.325*** 21.758*** 49.885***
Adjusted R2 0.477 0.606 0.552 0.485 0.893
Number of observations 600 600 500 600 600
Notes: The p-values are between brackets; ***; ** and; *indicate that the relationships are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels,
respectively. Variables of the study are described as follows: the UK CG compliance and disclosure index (UKCGI); board size (BSE);
board size squared (BSE2); the proportion of independent outside directors (IOE); board gender and ethnicity diversity (BD); the
existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC); managerial ownership (MANO); managerial ownership squared (MANO2); institutional
ownership (ISTO); institutional ownership squared (ISTO2); block ownership (BLKO); block ownership squared (BLKO2); firm size (LTA);
firm age (LAG); capital expenditure (CEX); sales growth (SG); Gearing (GR); and profitability (Q)
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thereby minimising the demand of providing more transparent information (Ntim and
Soobaroyen, 2013).
In addition to the above robustness tests and to address potential endogeneity concerns that
might emerge from simultaneous relationship among board characteristics, ownership
structure variables and voluntary CG disclosure practices, a lagged structure model has been
estimated, whereby the current year CG disclosure practices depend on the previous year’s
board and ownership mechanisms. The results reported in Model 3 of Table VII stay almost the
same as the results provided previously in Model 6 of Table V, suggesting that the findings are
fairly robust to possible endogeneity issues that might emerge from simultaneous relationship
among board characteristics, ownership structure variables and voluntary CG disclosures.
Additionally, CG mechanism and disclosures are generally “sticky” over-time, and thus,
simply estimating a lagged structure may not be able to fully address the presence of any
potential endogeneities. Therefore and to address the possible endogeneity concerns that
may emerge from omitted variable bias, two-stage least squares (2SLS) model has been
estimated. Following Beiner et al. (2006), a Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (DWH) has been
conducted to examine whether an endogenous relationship between the UKCGI and
board/ownership mechanisms exists. Applying Durbin–Wu test to Model 6 of Table V, the
test indicates the existence of endogeneity problems, thereby implying that 2SLS
regression analysis may be more suitable compared to the OLS approach. Therefore, and
in line with prior literature (Beiner et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2013), in the first stage, we
conjectured that the CG mechanisms (i.e. board and ownership characteristics) are
influenced by the eight control variables. In the second stage, the predicted values of the
board and ownership characteristics are used as instruments and re-estimated Model 6 of
Table V. Overall, the findings reported in Model 4 of Table VII remain essentially the same
as those contained in Model 6 of Table V, thus indicating that the findings appear to be
robust to possible endogeneity issue that might emerge from omitted variable bias.
Finally, fixed-effect model has been estimated address possible firm-level heterogeneity. This
model has been estimated because it has been suggested that theremay be other unobserved
firm-specific factors, which can impact on voluntary CG disclosure practices that our OLS
approach may be unable to determine (Ntim et al., 2012a; Upadhyay and Zeng, 2014). To
control for unobserved firm-level characteristics, Model 6 of Table V has been re-estimated by
including 99 dummies to represent 100 sampled firms. The findings shown in Model 5 of
Table VII remain generally the same, indicating that the findings of the study are fairly robust to
the presence of any possible endogeneity issues that may emerge firm-specific heterogeneity.
7. Conclusions
Although several of previous studies have link the association among CG mechanisms and
general voluntary disclosure practices over the past decades, studies examining how and
to what extent board and ownership mechanisms impact on the level of compliance with,
and disclosure of, CG practices included in the influential 2010 UK Combined Code are
rare. Therefore, this paper investigates voluntary CG compliance and disclosure among
firms listed in UK and consequently examines whether the ownership and board
characteristics can explain observable differences CG practices, with specific focus on the
period following the 2007/2008 global financial crisis.
In addition to proposing and applying a neo-institutional theoretical view to investigate the
antecedents of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure, our results extend, as well as
contribute to, the extant studies by using one of the most extensive data-to-date on CG
disclosures constituting 120 CG provisions extracted from the 2010 UK Combined Code;
the study provide new evidence, which indicates that the CG practices vary substantially
among the sampled firms. This implies that there is a substantial degree of variation among
UK listed firms in relation to the importance that they attached to good CG practices.
VOL. 16 NO. 3 2016 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PAGE 531
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f H
ud
de
rs
fie
ld
 A
t 0
6:
39
 0
9 
Ju
ne
 2
01
6 
(P
T)
The findings indicate that the level CG disclosure is high in corporations that have larger
boards, more independent directors and more diversified boards but low in corporations
that have higher managerial ownership and block ownership. By contrary, the study finds
no association between the existence of a separate CG committee, institutional ownership
and voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. Overall, the results are generally
in line with the efficiency and legitimation implications of our neo-institutional theoretical
framework. The results are also generally the same across a number of econometric
models that address different endogeneity concerns and alternative CG disclosure indices.
The findings of this study have a number of implications for policymakers, regulatory
authorities and other countries. First, the findings of the study indicate the level of CG
compliance and disclosure varies substantially among the UK listed firms. This provides
UK policymakers and regulatory authorities (e.g. LSE and FRC) with a strong motivation to
find ways to strengthen enforcement further. One way to enhance CG compliance and
disclosure is by establishing a compliance and enforcement committee. Further, more
effective cooperation and coordination among the key regulatory and enforcement bodies
can enhance legal enforcement, which, in turn, can improve CG compliance and
disclosure behaviour among listed firms. Second, UK firms with more women on their
boards have higher levels of CG compliance and disclosure than those with less women on
their boards (i.e. see Model 1 of Table VI), suggesting that women have strong motivation
to actively monitor CG standards, which, in turn, seems to enhance CG practices within
firms. This implies that the recommendations of Davies Report (2015) for more women on
UK boards may be considered as positive CG development. However, we also find that
firm-level voluntary CG disclosure is lower in firms with more ethnic minorities on their boards,
which does not lend support to the prediction that board ethnic diversity increases board
independence and effectiveness. The negative effect of ethnic minorities on voluntary CG
compliance and disclosure may due to their extremely low representation (i.e. 1.37 per cent,
see Table III), as many of the sampled firms have few non-white directors on their boards. This
may encourage UK policymakers and regulatory authorities to introduce new CG provisions
which may promote the participation of non-white directors in UK boardrooms. Third, we find
a statistically insignificant relationship between firm-level CG compliance and disclosure and
institutional ownership. The insignificant effect of institutional shareholders indicates that
institutional investors are not efficient in monitoring (Dong and Ozkan, 2008). Therefore, UK
policymakers and regulatory authorities may be encouraged to introduce new legislation that
increases shareholder activism, particularly by institutional shareholders, to require listed firms
to provide additional information on CG compliance. Finally, our results may be relevant to other
countries, as UK CG practices are suggested to have a significant influence on the
development of CG codes of many countries around the world; thus, the findings of this paper
can be generalised to other countries.
Whilst the results of this study are robust, this study may suffer a number of limitations that
suggest a need for more research. First, this study uses un-weighted coding scheme,
which regards all CG provisions included in the index to have equal importance, which may
not be the case both in theory and practice. However, the use of un-weighted coding
scheme is justified as follows:
 the use of un-weighted coding avoids subjectivity in assigning weights to the disclosed
items (Botosan, 1997);
 there is no agreed theoretical basis for assigning weights to different CG provisions
(Barako et al., 2006);
 evidence from prior studies suggests that both weighted and un-weighted CG indices
are similar in terms of results (Barako et al., 2006); and
 the binary scoring is adopted in our study to facilitate comparison with the results of
past studies (Barako et al. 2006; Collett and Hrasky, 2005; Khan et al., 2013; Ntim et al.,
2012a, 2012b; Samaha et al., 2012).
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Second, although our study relies mainly on annual reports to collect required data, using
other sources of information, such as analyst reports and face-to-face interviews could
assist in obtaining more detailed data. However, we use firms’ annual reports because they
are considered to be the most regular and reliable sources of information about CG
(Botosan, 1997). Additionally, we use only annual reports to be consistent and to facilitate
comparison with the results of prior studies (Elshandidy and Neri, 2015; Ntim, 2015;
Padgett and Shabbir, 2005). Third, due to data limitations, the investigation in this study is
limited to internal CG mechanisms that potentially influence voluntary CG compliance and
disclosure practices. As explained below, future studies may include both external and
internal CG mechanisms. Finally, endogeneity problems cannot be completely eliminated.
However, this study follows existing literature (Beiner et al., 2006; Core et al., 2015; Gippel
et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2012 a, 2012b; Schultz et al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012) by adopting
different estimation methods to control for potential endogeneity problems, including
estimating two stage least squares, fixed-effects and lagged structures.
The evidence provided in this paper offers potential theoretical and empirical insights for future
studies. In terms of theoretical expansions, the evidence indicates that future studies can
possibly enhance their theoretical grounds by relying on the insights provided by other closely
related governance theories, including neo-institutional, public accountability and stewardship
theories, when examining factors, which can influence CG compliance and disclosure
practices. With respect to empirical insights and given the focus of this paper on the UK, the
evidence offers potential avenues for future studies that can investigate the antecedents of CG
compliance and disclosure in different international governance environments (i.e. developed
and developing counties). This may help in developing a better understanding of antecedents
of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure in different CG environments. Additionally, and as
explained above, data used in the current study is primarily gathered from firms’ annual reports;
however, annual reports can communicate mixed messages, as a result of that, future studies
might collect data using qualitative approach, such as face-to-face interviews and case
studies, and this may allow providing a complete understanding of different drivers of voluntary
CG compliance and disclosure. Also, the construction of a CG index may be improved by
future studies in a number of ways:
 by investigating whether the findings are sensitive or robust to different scoring
schemes; and
 by surveying professional organisations about the weight and importance attached to
CG provisions.
This can help improve the reliability and validity of the constructed index. Finally, we mainly
investigate the association between internal CG mechanisms and voluntary CG
compliance and disclosure. As data become available, future studies can investigate the
influence of external CG mechanisms (e.g. the market for corporate control), on CG
compliance and disclosure.
Notes
1. It should be noted that the term “voluntary disclosure” used in this paper refers to the voluntary CG
compliance/disclosure regime that has been popularised by the UK’s 1992 Cadbury Report in
contrast to the “comply or else” (mandatory) CG compliance and disclosure regime, which has
been advocated by the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Thus, the operationalisation of the “voluntary
disclosure” terminology in this case is different from the traditional understanding of reporting over
and above mandatory disclosure requirements.
2. First and in line with previous studies (Melis et al., 2015; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013), financials
and utilities (685 corporations) are excluded in our sample for this study for two main reasons: they
have different capital structure; and they are subject to different regulations (Guest, 2009; Ntim et
al., 2012a, 2012b), which can impact differently on the level of their voluntary CG disclosures.
Second, 319 corporations with missing annual reports/data/listed recently were also excluded,
leaving us with 293 firms with full data. The classification of the remaining 293 corporations is as
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follows: basic-material consists of 27 (9 per cent) corporations; consumer-goods consist of 36 (13
per cent) corporations; consumer-service consists of 68 (23 per cent) corporations; healthcare
consists of 15 (5 per cent) corporations; industrial consists of 102 (35 per cent) corporations; oil
and gas consist of 18 (6 per cent) corporations; technology consist of 22 (7 per cent) corporations;
and telecommunication consist of 5 (2 per cent) corporations. Third, because the number of
observations from healthcare, oil and gas and telecommunication industries was relatively small,
the observations from these three industries were added to basic-material, consumer-services and
technology industries. In particular, corporations operating oil and gas industry were included in
basic-material industry, corporations operating in health-care industry were added to
consumer-services industry, whilst corporations operating in the telecommunication industry were
added to the technology industry. Finally, because collecting data manually from corporations’
annual reports is considered to be a tedious work coupled with the extensive nature of the CG
disclosure, ownership and board structures and financial data required, a final balanced sample
of 100 firms from 2008 to 2013 (i.e. resulting in a sample of 600 company-year observations) were
stratifiedly sampled using both firm size and industry type. Specifically, the largest ten
corporations and the smallest ten corporations were selected (i.e. 20 corporations from each of the
main 5 industries) using market capitalisation.
3. For brevity, we do not provide the full list of 120 CG provisions examined but will be made easily
available on request. Specifically, the constructed UKCGI contains CG provisions from each of the
five sub-indices, including 8, 37, 36, 22 and 17 CG provisions relating to board leadership, board
effectiveness, board accountability, executive pay and relations with shareholders, respectively.
For example: leadership (i.e. whether the chairperson is also the CEO “0” or not “1”);
“effectiveness” (i.e. whether the chairperson is either independent “1” or not “0”); “accountability”
(i.e. whether a firm has a risk management committee “1” or not “0”); “remuneration” (i.e. whether
disclosure is made about the remuneration policy “1” or not “0”); and “relations with shareholders”
(i.e. whether a board’s members attend annual general meetings “1” or not “0”).
4. The content analysis for this study was performed by a single coder. However, to make sure that the
reliability, validity and consistency of coding, in the first round of coding, a primary sample of ten
corporations (two corporations from each of the main five industries) over the period 2008-2013 was
coded. Coding categories and codedmaterials were critically discussed with two experienced coders
and then in the second round any mistakes or inconsistencies identified independently by the two
coders in the first round, were discussed and corrected. A further ten firms were coded, but the two
experienced coders independently did not identify any mistakes or inconsistencies with the coding
procedure. This ensured near perfect correlation between the first- and second-stage coding, and
thus, high levels of consistency, reliability and validity were achieved.
5. The current study used Cronbach’s alpha to examine the internal consistency of the constructed
index. The Cronbach’s alpha value for the five categories in the UKCGI is 0.88, indicating that the
compliance and disclosure index used in this study is a reliable measure of voluntary CG
compliance and disclosure practices (Allegrini and Greco, 2013).
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